

Ph.D. in ECONOMICS 2023-24

APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO POLITICAL ECONOMICS

Group Contests

Prof. Mario Gilli

PURPOSE:

This course is an introduction to topics in game theory. Its objective is to equip the students with tools essential to study political economics and for setting up and solving a wide range of economic problems. This year Reading Group will be on **Group Contests**: conflicts among groups is one the most interesting subfields within contest theory, and it is particular for political economy applications.

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

The course consists of two lectures and of students' presentations of well-established papers.

Information and material can be found at

<https://elearning.unimib.it/course/view.php?id=52964>

I strongly suggest registering at this page.

DETAILED TIMETABLE OF THE LECTURES

	Topic of the lecture	Day	References
L1	<u>Introduction - 1</u>	17/10/2023 2.30 – 5.00 p.m. Demographic Seminar Room U7-2062	Lecture notes
L2	<u>Introduction - 2</u>	18/10/2023 8.30 – 11.00 a.m. DEMS Seminar Room U7-2104	Lecture notes
L3	<u>Introduction - 3</u>	25/10/2023 8.30 – 11.00 a.m. DEMS Seminar Room U7-2104	
L4	<u>Presentation - 1</u>	08/11/2023 8.30 – 10.30 a.m. DEMS Seminar Room U7-2104	
L5	<u>Presentation - 2</u>	21/11/2023 2.30 – 5.00 p.m. Demographic Seminar Room U7-2062	
L6	<u>Presentation - 3</u>	28/11/2023 2.30 – 5.00 p.m. Demographic Seminar Room U7-2062	

Group Contest References

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